The interpersonal effect of guilt expressions on cooperation: The role of social perceptions by MELIA, Nadhilla Velda
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access) Dissertations and Theses
9-2018
The interpersonal effect of guilt expressions on
cooperation: The role of social perceptions
Nadhilla Velda MELIA
Singapore Management University, nvmelia.2016@phdps.smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/etd_coll
Part of the Social Psychology Commons
This Master Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access) by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
MELIA, Nadhilla Velda. The interpersonal effect of guilt expressions on cooperation: The role of social perceptions. (2018).
Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access).
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/etd_coll/192
  
 
 
The Interpersonal Effect of Guilt Expressions on Cooperation: The Role 
of Social Perceptions 
 
by 
Nadhilla Velda Melia 
 
 
 
Submitted to School of Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree 
of Master of Philosophy in Psychology 
 
 
Thesis Committee: 
 
Tsai Ming-Hong (Supervisor/Chair) 
Assistant Professor of Psychology 
Singapore Management University 
 
William Tov 
Associate Professor of Psychology 
Singapore Management University 
 
Norman Li 
Associate Professor of Psychology 
Singapore Management University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Singapore Management University 
2018 
 
Copyright (2018) Nadhilla Velda Melia
  
 
 
The Interpersonal Effect of Guilt Expressions on Cooperation: The Role of Social Perceptions 
by 
Nadhilla Velda Melia 
 
People can make inferences about an individual based on his or her emotional 
expressions, and these inferences can affect their subsequent behavior. I conducted two 
experiments to investigate the social perceptions associated with a transgressor’s guilt expression 
after he or she commits a social transgression, and how these would subsequently affect the 
cooperative behavior of the victims of the transgression. Study 1 demonstrated that there was an 
indirect effect of a transgressor’s guilt expression on a victim’s cooperation via the victim’s 
perception of the transgressor’s benevolence, but not via the victim’s perception of the 
transgressor’s perspective-taking. Study 2 showed partial support for an indirect effect of a 
transgressor’s benevolence, but not a transgressor’s perspective-taking, on a victim’s cooperation 
via the victim’s perception of the transgressor’s guilt emotions. The results also suggest a 
bidirectional relationship between a victim’s perceptions of a transgressor’s guilt and 
benevolence, such that one can be inferred from the other. This research suggests the 
mechanisms regarding the appeasement function of guilt (i.e. through social perceptions) and 
illustrates how relationships may be repaired after a social transgression by examining social 
transgressions from the perspective of the victim, rather than the transgressor.  
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Introduction 
Social transgressions are inevitable in human relationships. Previous research has 
investigated social transgressions in a wide variety of domains, such as romantic relationships 
(Luchies et al., 2013), the workplace (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2014), politics (Gonzales, Kovera, 
Sullivan, & Chanley, 1995), and child development (Smetana, 1984). Research has also shown 
the negative consequences of committing a social transgression, such as punishment (Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002) and the dissolution of the relationship altogether (Fu, Wu, & Wang, 2009). Given 
the pervasiveness of social transgressions and their consequences in our everyday lives, it is 
important to understand how human relationships can recover from such transgressions. Certain 
emotion expressions can play a vital role in this recovery. Going as far back as Darwin (1872), 
researchers (Schmidt & Cohn, 2001; Shariff & Tracy, 2011) have proposed that emotion 
expressions first evolved to enable an organism to respond appropriately to environmental 
stimuli and eventually, as social relationships became more and more essential for survival, these 
expressions evolved to serve the function of communicating important social information. Van 
Kleef’s (2009) Emotions as Social Information (EASI) model supports this proposed 
evolutionary function and further suggests that emotional expressions affect others’ behavior 
through inferential processes about the expresser’s feelings, attitudes, and intentions. The EASI 
model provides an important foundation for the study of the interpersonal effects of emotion 
expressions and their role in the maintenance of human relationships. The present investigation 
explores the perceptions associated with guilt expressions specifically and their impact on 
perceivers’ cooperative behavior in a social transgression situation. 
Guilt refers to an individual’s unpleasant emotional state associated with possible 
objections to his or her behavior (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). Baumeister et al. 
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(1994) propose that guilt is an interpersonal emotion and is fundamentally social in nature. Guilt 
is usually experienced after an individual commits a social transgression, and this emotion 
motivates the individual to engage in acts that could make up for the transgression (Tangney, 
Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). Guilt is often confused with shame and embarrassment since 
these emotions may also arise after committing a transgression (Baumeister et al., 1994; Keltner, 
1996). However, guilt can be distinguished from shame and embarrassment on the basis of 
specificity. Guilt is typically focused on the transgression itself (Tangney et al., 1996) and is 
associated with responses that are aimed at rectifying the damage caused by the transgression 
(Ketelaar & Au, 2003). On the other hand, shame and embarrassment are typically focused on 
the entire self as a whole (Lewis, 1971) and lead to negative self-evaluations, such as feelings of 
inadequacy, inferiority, and worthlessness, as well as withdrawal behaviors (Tangney et al., 
1996), although embarrassment is much milder and more transient (Buss, 1980). Thus, guilt has 
a more specific focus than shame and embarrassment. Although guilt may be an unpleasant and 
undesirable feeling, several researchers have proposed positive functions of the emotion of guilt. 
Evolutionary theorists propose that guilt is an adaptation for preventing us from performing acts 
that may damage our relationships with others, which are vital to survival and reproduction 
(Trivers, 1985). Baumeister et al. (1994) also propose that guilt expressions have an appeasement 
function as they may mitigate the severity of any negative reactions from others after a social 
transgression. 
Due to the focus on emotion expressions in this paper, it is important to outline what 
constitutes a guilt expression. Several emotions, such as anger, sadness, disgust, fear, and 
happiness, have distinct universal facial expressions associated with them (Ekman & Friesen, 
1971). However, Keltner (1996) found that guilt does not seem to have a reliably distinct facial 
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expression. Rather, guilt seems to be expressed more via verbal expressions of confession and 
apology and reparative behavior (Aune, Metts, & Ebesu-Hubbard, 1998; Hareli & Eisikovits, 
2006). Apologies must both admit responsibility for the transgression and express remorse 
(Scher & Darley, 1997), both of which are fundamental to the concept of guilt. For example, a 
study on the experience and expression of guilt in married couples (Guerrero, La Valley, & 
Farinelli, 2008) and in the workplace (O'Neill, 2009) measured guilt via apology/concession and 
explanations/justifications items. Researchers also typically manipulate guilt expressions via 
written statements of guilt (Kamau, Giner-Sorolla, & Zebel, 2013; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & 
Manstead, 2006). Based on this existing research, this paper will focus on verbal expressions of 
guilt, such as statements of apology, rather than non-verbal facial expressions. 
Previous research has suggested that guilt expressions communicate interpersonal 
sensitivity and a willingness to appreciate another’s perspective, as well as signal a concern for 
another individual (Van Kleef et al., 2006). In turn, these perceptions of a person’s willingness to 
appreciate another’s perspective and concern for others have been found to elicit cooperative 
behavior from perceivers (Gächter, Herrmann, & Thöni, 2004; Goldstein, Vezich, & Shapiro, 
2014). Hence, in this paper, I identified perceptions of a transgressor’s perspective-taking and 
benevolence as essential social perceptions that are associated with a transgressor’s guilt 
expression and that can elicit a victim’s cooperation. Perspective-taking, or cognitive empathy, is 
defined as the ability to understand another’s point of view (M. H. Davis, 1983). Benevolence is 
defined as the extent to which an individual is believed to be willing to benefit others (Mayer, 
Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). In contrast to most of the existing research on social transgressions 
which focus on the actions of the transgressor and provide abundant support that the experience 
of guilt causes the transgressor to engage in appeasing behaviors (Ahn, Kim, & Aggarwal, 2014; 
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Berscheid & Walster, 1967; Cunningham, Steinberg, & Grev, 1980; De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & 
Breugelmans, 2007; Ketelaar & Au, 2003), this research is one of the few that focuses on the 
victim’s own behavior and responses to a transgressor’s appeasement attempts. Based on the 
EASI Model (Van Kleef, 2009), I believe that social perceptions are the key to understanding 
victims’ responses and this investigation serves as the pioneering research that empirically 
explores the indirect effect of a transgressor’s guilt expression on a victim’s cooperation via 
social perceptions. 
Perceptions of Perspective-Taking 
It has been proposed that an individual feels guilt when he or she recognizes that another 
is distressed, suggesting that an individual must engage in perspective-taking in order to feel 
guilty in the first place (Hoffman, 1982). Perspective-taking also serves as an important cue that 
a relational partner understands and cares about us (Koenig, Willer, & Trees, 2013), which are 
important qualities for relationship repair (Steiner, 2000). Perspective-taking has also been 
identified as an essential component of potential responses in interpersonal conflict (M. H. 
Davis, Capobianco, & Kraus, 2004), which can include situations of social transgressions. For 
example, in the context of bullying in the workplace, it has been found that perceptions of an 
offender’s perspective-taking positively influenced victims’ conciliatory attitudes (Berndsen, 
Wenzel, Thomas, & Noske, 2017), which can help to resolve the interpersonal conflict. Thus, the 
perception of a transgressor’s perspective-taking is an important construct to consider when 
investigating how guilt expressions can play a role in relationship repair after a social 
transgression. 
Guilt expressions may signal high levels of perspective-taking. Guilt is associated with 
several other-focused responses, such as cooperative (De Hooge et al., 2007; Ketelaar & Au, 
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2003), helping (Ahn et al., 2014; Cunningham et al., 1980), and apology behavior (Howell, 
Turowski, & Buro, 2012), as well as a willingness to compensate the victim (Berscheid & 
Walster, 1967). Such appeasement responses are likely to require an understanding of the 
victim’s perspective in two ways. Firstly, the transgressor must be able to understand that his or 
her transgression has had negative consequences for the victim in order to even realize that 
amends need to be made (Batson, 1991). Secondly, the transgressor who wishes to make amends 
must be able to identify what actions he or she can take in order to successfully rectify the 
situation and restore the victim’s positive attitude toward him or herself (Coke, Batson, & 
McDavis, 1978; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Stearns & Parrott, 2012). Thus, the guilty 
transgressor is likely to have higher levels of perspective-taking than the non-guilty transgressor. 
This is supported by previous research, which found that guilt-prone people (Leith & 
Baumeister, 1998) and people who were experiencing guilt (Yang, Yang, & Chiou, 2010) were 
better at perspective taking. Furthermore, Hareli and Eisikovits (2006) suggest that guilt 
expressions signal awareness of the negative consequences caused by a transgression, which 
requires perspective-taking. Thus, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: A transgressor’s guilt expression is positively related to a victim’s 
perception of the transgressor’s perspective-taking. 
A victim who perceives the transgressor as high in perspective-taking may in turn exhibit 
cooperation and cooperation-relevant responses towards the transgressor. A victim may perceive 
a transgressor who has high levels of perspective-taking to be able to understand and prioritize 
the victim’s own needs and wants (Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein, 1995; Blumer, 1969; Galinsky, 
Ku, & Wang, 2005). Since people respond positively when they are understood (Swann, 1987), 
this may in turn increase the victim’s willingness to cooperate with the transgressor. A victim 
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may also be more likely to cooperate with a transgressor who is perceived as high in perspective-
taking because perspective-takers are able to engage in behaviors that can mitigate the threat 
associated with cooperation (Williams, 2007). Previous research also demonstrated that when an 
individual perceived that another had taken their perspective, they would offer more help to the 
perspective taker (Goldstein et al., 2014). A victim’s perception of a transgressor’s perspective-
taking also leads the victim to forgive the transgressor (Berndsen et al., 2017) and facilitates trust 
repair between the victim and the transgressor (Williams, 2012), leading to greater cooperation 
in the future (Karremans & Van Lange, 2004; Mayer et al., 1995). Thus, I propose the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1b: A victim’s perception of a transgressor’s perspective-taking is positively 
related to the victim’s cooperation. 
Hypothesis 1c: A transgressor’s guilt expression is indirectly and positively related to a 
victim’s cooperation via the victim’s perception of the transgressor’s perspective-taking. 
Perceptions of Benevolence 
 The Stereotype Content Model (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007) proposes that all 
interpersonal perceptions form along the dimensions of warmth and competence. According to 
the EASI model (Van Kleef, 2009), emotion expressions are likely to provide information for 
such perceptions to occur. The Stereotype Content Model also highlights the primacy of warmth 
judgments, suggesting that people are more sensitive to warmth information as compared to 
competence information. Warmth perceptions are an indication of another person’s intent for 
good (i.e. their benevolence; DeRue, Nahrgang, & Ashford, 2015; Rom, Weiss, & Conway, 
2017). Taken together, the Stereotype Content Model and the EASI model suggest that emotion 
expressions can provide information regarding an expresser’s benevolence. For example, it has 
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been found that a leader’s expression of a positive emotion, such as gratitude, positively 
influenced followers’ perceptions of the leader’s benevolence (Ritzenhöfer, Brosi, Spörrle, & 
Welpe, 2017). Wojciszke (2005) further suggests that information regarding an individual’s 
benevolence is more relevant than competence information when interpreting the transgressive 
acts of others. Thus, it is likely that perceptions of benevolence would be salient following 
another’s expression of guilt after a social transgression. Moreover, following a social 
transgression, there is an imbalance of esteem within a dyad with the victim having less esteem 
than the transgressor (Baumeister et al., 1994). Equity theory (Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 
1973) proposes that when the distribution of assets in a relationship (including esteem) is 
inequitable, individuals will experience distress. The theory proposes that an apology (i.e. a guilt 
expression) from a transgressor may restore the balance of esteem in a relationship by conveying 
signals of courtesy, effort, and concern towards the victim (Smith, Bolton, & Wagner, 1999), 
which are also signals of benevolence. Thus, benevolence seems to be a key perception 
associated with guilt expressions in social transgression situations. 
Given the proactive nature and prosocial responses associated with feelings of guilt, an 
expression of guilt may indicate to others, especially the victim of the transgression, that the 
transgressor is committed to making amends to rectify the situation (Baumeister et al., 1994). 
Thus, the victim is more likely to trust that a guilty transgressor will treat them better in the 
future compared to a non-guilty transgressor. This is supported by Levine, Bitterly, Cohen, and 
Schweitzer (2018), who found that guilt-proneness predicts benevolence-based trustworthiness. 
Furthermore, previous research found that a leader’s apology (i.e. a guilt expression) is effective 
for re-establishing trust, including benevolence-based trust, among followers (Haesevoets et al., 
2016) and that organizations which make use of affective recovery efforts, such as apologies, 
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improve perceptions of their benevolence (Xie & Peng, 2009). Apologies also signal ethical 
conduct and a concern for others (Byrne, Barling, & Dupré, 2014), which would indicate high 
benevolence. Thus, I propose the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 2a: A transgressor’s guilt expression is positively related to a victim’s 
perception of the transgressor’s benevolence. 
 An individual’s perception of an actor’s benevolence may be positively associated with 
the individual’s willingness to cooperate with the actor. For example, previous research found 
that strong perceptions of trust, such as benevolence-based trust, positively influence cooperative 
behavior in social dilemmas (De Cremer, Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001). An individual’s belief in 
others’ benevolence is also positively correlated to the individual’s cooperative behavior with 
others (Gächter et al., 2004). Relatedly, affect-based trust toward a peer (i.e., a belief that an 
individual is benevolent), rather than cognition-based trust, is more likely to increase cooperation 
(Ng & Chua, 2006) and is positively related to the amount of interpersonal helping behavior 
directed toward the peer (McAllister, 1995). Perceptions of benevolence can also influence 
cooperation in tasks. For example, perceptions of others’ benevolence are positively associated 
with idea sharing (Chua, Morris, & Mor, 2012) and knowledge sharing (Usoro, Sharratt, Tsui, & 
Shekhar, 2007). Thus, I propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2b: A victim’s perception of a transgressor’s benevolence is positively related 
to the victim’s cooperation. 
Hypothesis 2c: A transgressor’s guilt expression is indirectly and positively related to a 
victim’s cooperation via the victim’s perception of the transgressor’s benevolence. 
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The Present Research 
In order to test the relationships between a transgressor’s guilt expression, a victim’s 
perception of the transgressor’s perspective-taking, a victim’s perception of the transgressor’s 
benevolence, and a victim’s cooperation, two studies were conducted. The first study was an 
experimental study aimed at investigating the indirect effect of a transgressor’s guilt expression 
on a victim’s cooperative behavior towards the transgressor via the victim’s perceptions of the 
transgressor’s perspective-taking and benevolence. In this study, the transgressor’s guilt or 
neutral expression was manipulated in the context of an allocation game and participants were 
the victims of a social transgression. The second study was an experimental study aimed at 
investigating the indirect effect of a transgressor’s perspective-taking, as well as a transgressor’s 
benevolence, on a victim’s cooperation via the victim’s perception of the transgressor’s guilt. 
The purpose of this study was to test for the possibility that guilt is inferred from perspective-
taking and benevolence, rather than perspective-taking and benevolence being inferred from guilt 
expressions, and that it is the perception of a transgressor’s guilt that will lead to a victim’s 
cooperative behavior towards the transgressor. In this study, the transgressor’s perspective-taking 
and benevolence were manipulated in a scenario-based study and participants were asked to 
imagine themselves as victims of a transgression. These two studies together will help to clarify 
the exact nature of the relationship between a transgressor’s guilt expression and perceptions of 
the transgressor’s perspective-taking and benevolence, and their subsequent relation to a victim’s 
cooperative behavior. I predetermined the minimum sample size based on available resources 
and the most recent and relevant research (e.g. Shore & Parkinson, 2017). I stopped gathering 
data within one academic semester for both studies. I performed data analyses only after 
stopping data collection. 
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Study 1 
Participants 
 I recruited 222 university student participants (72.5% female; age: M = 21.13, SD = 1.64; 
number of years of working experience: M = 1.31, SD = 1.35) in Singapore. Students were 
awarded course credit for their participation and participants were given a chance to earn an 
extra $2.50 Singapore Dollars if they were one of the top 3 participants who earned the most 
points in the allocation game.  
Procedure and Measures 
 Participants entered the lab and were seated at individual cubicles. Participants were 
informed that they would be playing the Dictator Game online with a randomly assigned 
counterpart for an unknown number of rounds. In the Dictator Game developed by Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler (1986), there are two players – the Dictator and the Recipient. The Dictator 
is given 100 points that he or she can split in any way he or she chooses with the Recipient 
whereas the Recipient simply receives the amount of points that the Dictator assigns to him or 
her. Participants were given instructions on how to play the Dictator Game and they also read 
that the role of Dictator and Recipient would be randomly assigned in each round. Participants 
were also informed that the top three participants with the highest total number of points would 
receive an extra $2.50. They also read that they may exchange messages with their counterpart 
after each round. After reading the instructions, participants answered some questions and 
received feedback on their answers to ensure that they understood the rules of the game.  
 After inputting their initials, participants were shown a page with a loading animation 
while they were informed that they were randomly being assigned to a counterpart. The loading 
animation was used to enhance the believability that they were indeed being paired with a real 
 11 
 
 
person when in fact their counterpart was actually a computer simulation. Participants were then 
informed that “SM” (the initials of the paired counterpart) had been randomly assigned to be 
their counterpart. All of SM’s responses were pre-programmed. They also read that for the first 
round, they had been randomly selected to be the Recipient whereas SM had been randomly 
selected to be the Dictator. They were then presented with another loading animation while SM 
allocated the points. All participants were informed that SM had decided to give them zero 
points. Participants were then informed that SM was writing them a message while being 
presented with another loading animation. Participants in the guilt expression condition received 
the message: “Hi [Participant’s initials]. I feel guilty about my actions in the previous round. I 
feel very sorry and regret my actions.” Participants in the neutral expression condition received 
the message: “Hi [Participant’s initials].” These manipulations followed the work of Kamau et 
al. (2013) and Van Kleef et al. (2006). Participants were also given a chance to send their own 
message to SM if they wished. 
As a manipulation check, participants were then asked to rate how much they thought SM 
was feeling certain emotions “right now” using the 20-item positive affect and negative affect 
scale (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great deal). 
The item of interest was the ‘Guilty’ item. Participants were also asked to rate their perceptions 
of SM’s feelings “right now” using the Guilt subscale of the State Shame and Guilt Scale (SSGS) 
(Marschall, Sanftner, & Tangney, 1994). This subscale consisted of 5 items (α = 0.95) on a 5-
point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = a great deal) and sample items included: “SM feels remorse, 
regret,” “SM feels tension about what s/he did,” and “SM cannot stop thinking about the bad 
thing s/he did.”  
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Participants were then asked to rate their perceptions of SM’s perspective-taking using 4 
items (α = 0.92) adapted from the Perspective-taking subscale of the State Empathy scale (Shen, 
2010). Sample items included: “SM can see my point of view,” “SM can recognize my 
situation,” and “SM can understand what I am going through.” These items were rated on a 5-
point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = completely). Participants also rated their perceptions of SM’s 
benevolence using 3 items (α = 0.94) adapted from Levin and Cross (2004). The items included: 
“SM would now look out for my interests,” “SM would now go out of his or her way to make 
sure I am not damaged or harmed,” and “SM would now care what happens to me.” These items 
were rated on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The order in which 
these two scales were presented to participants were randomized in order to reduce common 
method bias by controlling for possible priming effects, induced mood states, and other biases 
(Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).  
 After completing these scales, participants were told that it was time for the second round 
of the Dictator Game. In this round, they were told that they had been randomly selected to be 
the Dictator whereas SM had been randomly selected to be the Recipient. They then entered the 
number of points they wished to give to SM out of a total of 100. The higher the number of 
points they allocated to SM, the higher their level of cooperation (Brosig, 2002). After inputting 
the number of points, participants were told that the Dictator Game had come to an end. 
Participants were then probed for suspicion. None of the participants could guess the hypothesis 
or suspected that SM was not a real person. Participants were then asked to fill in some 
demographics such as their age, gender, and number of years of work experience. Finally, 
participants were thanked and debriefed. 
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Results  
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the focal variables are presented in Table 1. 
Manipulation check. The results demonstrated the effectiveness of the manipulations. 
The t-test results demonstrated significant differences in perceptions regarding a transgressor’s 
guilt expression, SSGS: t(220) = -7.49, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.99; PANAS: t(220) = -6.18, p < 
.001, Cohen’s d = 0.82. Specifically, participants in the guilt expression condition (SSGS: M = 
2.58, SD = 1.13; PANAS: M = 2.94, SD = 1.39) perceived the transgressor as feeling more guilty 
than those in the neutral expression condition (SSGS: M = 1.61, SD = 0.79; PANAS: M = 1.93, 
SD = 1.04).  
The effects of a transgressor’s guilt expression. I conducted ANOVAs to examine the 
effects of a transgressor’s guilt expression. Participants’ cooperative behavior did not 
significantly differ between the guilt expression condition (M = 30.07, SD = 27.35) and the 
neutral expression condition (M = 34.54, SD = 30.11), F(1, 220) = 1.34, p = .249, ηp2 = .01. 
However, the effect of a transgressor’s guilt expression on perceptions of the transgressor’s 
perspective-taking was significant, with participants in the guilt expression condition (M = 2.94, 
SD = 1.16) perceiving the transgressor as higher in perspective-taking than those in the neutral 
expression condition (M = 2.36, SD = 1.10), F(1, 220) = 14.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .06, which 
supported Hypothesis 1a. The effect of a transgressor’s guilt expression on perceptions of the 
transgressor’s benevolence was also significant, with participants in the guilt expression 
condition (M = 3.35, SD = 1.53) perceiving the transgressor as higher in benevolence than those 
in the neutral expression condition (M = 2.67, SD = 1.33), F(1, 220) = 12.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .05, 
which supported Hypothesis 2a.  
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The effects of a transgressor’s guilt expression via social perceptions. I used ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression analyses and bootstrapping to examine indirect effects of a 
transgressor’s guilt expression on participants’ cooperation via the participants’ perceptions of 
the transgressor’s perspective-taking and benevolence. The results are presented in Table 2. 
The results of Model 1 demonstrated that a transgressor’s guilt versus neutral expression 
was not significantly associated with participants’ cooperation (B = -4.47, SE = 3.87, p = .249). 
Models 2 and 3 demonstrated that a transgressor’s guilt versus neutral expression was 
significantly positively associated with perceptions of the transgressor’s perspective-taking (B = 
0.58, SE = 0.15, p < .001) and benevolence (B = 0.69, SE = 0.19, p < .001), which supported 
Hypotheses 1a and 2a. The results of Model 4 demonstrated that when controlling for a 
transgressor’s emotion expression, perceptions of the transgressor’s benevolence was 
significantly positively associated with participants’ cooperation (B = 3.74, SE = 1.37, p = .007), 
which supported Hypothesis 2b. However, perceptions of the transgressor’s perspective-taking 
was not significantly associated with participants’ cooperation (B = -1.27, SE = 1.73, p = .466), 
which did not support Hypothesis 1b. 
The indirect effect of a transgressor’s guilt expression on participants’ cooperation via 
perceptions of the transgressor’s perspective-taking and benevolence were tested simultaneously 
using the bootstrapping method with 5000 repetitions. The results demonstrated significant 
indirect effects of a transgressor’s guilt versus neutral expression on participants’ cooperation via 
perceptions of the transgressor’s benevolence (B = 2.56, SE = 1.32, 0.43 < 95% CI < 5.57), 
which supported Hypothesis 2c. However, the results demonstrated non-significant indirect 
effects of a transgressor’s guilt versus neutral expression on participants’ cooperation via 
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perceptions of the transgressor’s perspective-taking (B = -0.74, SE = 1.05, -2.78 < 95% CI < 
1.45), which did not support Hypothesis 1c. 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 1 supported the hypothesis that a transgressor’s guilt 
expression is indirectly and positively related to a victim’s cooperation via the victim’s 
perception of the transgressor’s benevolence. However, the hypothesis that a transgressor’s guilt 
expression is indirectly and positively related to a victim’s cooperation via the victim’s 
perception of the transgressor’s perspective-taking was not supported. 
Study 2 
 In this study, a transgressor’s perspective-taking and benevolence were manipulated in a 
scenario-based study. The purpose of this study was to test for the possibility that guilt is inferred 
from perspective-taking and benevolence rather than perspective-taking and benevolence being 
inferred from guilt expressions, and that the perception of a transgressor’s guilt will lead to a 
victim’s cooperative behavior towards the transgressor. People have prototypes of emotions and 
these can be used to infer others’ emotional states even if the emotion is not explicitly expressed 
(Oatley, 1999). For example, trait anger has been found to be inferred from a target’s 
formidability and malevolence (Galperin, Fessler, Johnson, & Haselton, 2013). Infants also 
exhibited prosocial responses toward an experimenter who was transgressed against, suggesting 
that infants were able to infer the experimenter’s distress from being the victim of a transgression 
(Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009). The prototype of the emotion of guilt may include 
perspective-taking and benevolence behaviors (Baumeister et al., 1994; Hoffman, 1982). For 
example, people can infer an offender’s felt remorse from the offender’s ability to perspective-
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take (Berndsen et al., 2017). Hence, people may attribute guilt to those demonstrating 
perspective-taking and benevolence in a social transgression situation. In this scenario study, a 
transgressor’s perspective-taking and benevolence were manipulated and participants’ perception 
of the transgressor’s guilt was measured. The emotion of guilt usually arises in a social 
transgression situation therefore the scenario asked participants to imagine themselves in a 
situation where someone transgressed against them. The study followed a 2 (perspective-taking: 
high vs low) x 2 (benevolence: high vs low) between-subjects design.  
Participants  
I recruited 205 university student participants (69.8% female; age: M = 21.78, SD = 1.66; 
number of years of working experience: M = 1.67, SD = 1.81) in Singapore. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the following four conditions: high perspective-taking and high 
benevolence (N = 52), high perspective-taking and low benevolence (N = 53), low perspective-
taking and high benevolence (N = 51), and low perspective-taking and low benevolence (N = 
49).  
Procedure and Measures 
Participants read a scenario and were asked to imagine themselves in the scenario. The 
transgression scenario with the manipulations of high [low] perspective-taking and high [low] 
benevolence read as follows:  
 Imagine that you have an individual project for one of your classes. Your 
classmate is also in this class with you and is struggling to think of any 
ideas. Your classmate asks you for advice and you give some suggestions 
using your own idea as an example. The time for the presentation arrives. 
Your classmate’s presentation is in the week before yours. As you watch 
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your classmate’s presentation, you realize that your classmate completely 
stole your idea and is passing off your idea as their own. Knowing that you 
are watching the presentation, your classmate is able to understand your 
responses from your point of view. He or she can recognize your current 
situation and understand what you are going through. [Although you are 
watching the presentation, your classmate is not able to understand your 
responses from your point of view. He or she cannot recognize your 
current situation or understand what you are going through.] After the 
presentation, your classmate looks out for your interests. He or she goes 
out of his or her way to make sure you are not harmed. He or she also 
cares about what happens to you. [After the presentation, your classmate 
does not look out for your interests. He or she does not go out of his or her 
way to make sure you are not harmed. He or she also does not care about 
what happens to you.] 
After reading the scenario, participants rated how much they thought the classmate was 
feeling certain emotions “right now” using the 20-item PANAS scale and the Guilt subscale of 
the SSGS (α = 0.94) as in Study 1.  
Then, participants were presented with two measures of cooperation, whose order of 
presentation was randomized. First, cooperation was measured with a modified version of the 
Everyday Cooperation Scale (ECS) (De Hooge et al., 2007) which consisted of 9 items (α = 
0.88) on an 11-point scale (1 = not at all, 11 = very much). Sample items included: “I would like 
to help my classmate while others are looking at me,” “I would like to help my classmate when 
s/he does not know who is helping,” and “I would like to comfort my classmate if s/he is 
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emotionally very upset.” Second, cooperation was also measured with a modified version of the 
Social Value Orientation (SVO) scale (Van Lange, 1999). Participants were asked to imagine 
that that they would be allocating points for themselves and the classmate. There were 9 items (α 
= 0.98) and 3 possible responses for each item. The cooperative response was the one where the 
participant maximized the combined payoff for the self and the other. The individualistic 
response was the one where the participant maximized the payoff for the self and disregarded the 
payoff for the other. The competitive response was the one where the participant maximized the 
difference between the payoff for the self and the other. The number of cooperative responses 
was the dependent variable. 
As a manipulation check, participants also rated their perceptions of the classmate’s 
perspective-taking and benevolence using the scales in Study 1. Finally, participants filled in 
some demographics as in Study 1, and were thanked and debriefed. 
Results  
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the focal variables are presented in Table 3. 
Manipulation check. The results demonstrated the effectiveness of the manipulations. 
The t-test results demonstrated significant differences in perceptions regarding a transgressor’s 
perspective-taking, t(203) = -4.19, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.58. Specifically, participants in the 
high perspective-taking condition (M = 3.32, SD = 0.92) perceived the transgressor as higher in 
perspective-taking than those in the low perspective-taking condition (M = 2.74, SD = 1.07). The 
t-test results also demonstrated significant differences in perceptions regarding a transgressor’s 
benevolence, t(203) = -6.79, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.95. Specifically, participants in the high 
benevolence condition (M = 4.53, SD = 1.43) perceived the transgressor as higher in benevolence 
than those in the low benevolence condition (M = 3.13, SD = 1.51). 
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The effects of a transgressor’s perspective-taking and benevolence. I conducted two-
way ANOVAs to examine the effects of a transgressor’s perspective-taking and benevolence. 
Participants’ cooperative behavior did not significantly differ between the low perspective-taking 
condition (ECS: M = 4.78, SD = 0.20; SVO: M = 3.59, SD = 0.39) and the high perspective-
taking condition (ECS: M = 4.81, SD = 0.19; SVO: M = 3.20, SD = 0.38), ECS: F(1, 201) = 0.01, 
p = .919, ηp2 = .00; SVO: F(1, 201) = 0.51, p = .475, ηp2 = .00. Participants’ cooperative behavior 
also did not significantly differ between the low benevolence condition (ECS: M = 4.57, SD = 
0.20; SVO: M = 3.34, SD = 0.39) and the high benevolence condition (ECS: M = 5.02, SD = 
0.20; SVO: M = 3.46, SD = 0.39), ECS: F(1, 201) = 2.65, p = .105, ηp2 = .01; SVO: F(1, 201) = 
0.05, p = .833, ηp2 = .00. The interaction effect between perspective-taking and benevolence on 
cooperation was also not significant, ECS: F(1, 201) = 0.21, p = .650, ηp2 = .001; SVO: F(1, 201) 
= 0.77, p = .381, ηp2 = .00.  
Participants’ perceptions of the transgressor’s guilt emotions also did not significantly 
differ between the low perspective-taking condition (PANAS: M = 2.75, SD = 0.14; SSGS: M = 
2.44, SD = 0.10) and the high perspective-taking condition (PANAS: M = 2.87, SD = 0.13; 
SSGS: M = 2.65, SD = 0.09), PANAS: F(1, 201) = 0.39, p = .532, ηp2 = .002; SSGS: F(1, 201) = 
2.50, p = .115, ηp2 = .01. However, the effect of a transgressor’s benevolence on perceptions of a 
transgressor’s guilt emotions was significant, with participants in the low benevolence condition 
(PANAS: M = 2.34, SD = 0.14; SSGS: M = 2.06, SD = 0.10) perceiving the transgressor as 
feeling less guilt than those in the high benevolence condition (PANAS: M = 3.28, SD = 1.14; 
SSGS: M = 3.02, SD = 0.10), PANAS: F(1, 201) = 23.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .11; SSGS: F(1, 201) = 
51.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .21. The interaction effect between perspective-taking and benevolence on 
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perceptions of guilt was not significant, PANAS: F(1, 201) = 0.21, p = .647, ηp2 = .001; SSGS: 
F(1, 201) = 0.39, p = .535, ηp2 = .002. 
The effects of a transgressor’s perspective-taking and benevolence via perceptions of 
guilt. I used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and bootstrapping to examine indirect 
effects of a transgressor’s perspective-taking and benevolence on participants’ cooperation via 
the participants’ perceptions of the transgressor’s guilt emotions. The results are presented in 
Tables 4 and 5. 
The results of Models 1 and 2 demonstrated that a transgressor’s perspective-taking 
(ECS: B = 0.45, SE = 0.28, p = .107; SVO: B = -0.39, SE = 0.55, p = .477) and benevolence (ECS: 
B = 0.03, SE = 0.28, p = .920; SVO: B = 0.13, SE = 0.55, p = .816) was not significantly 
associated with participants’ cooperation. 
PANAS measure of guilt. Model 3 demonstrated that a transgressor’s benevolence was 
significantly positively associated with perceptions of the transgressor’s guilt (B = 0.94, SE = 
0.19, p < .001), but the transgressor’s perspective-taking was not (B = 0.12, SE = 0.19, p = .530). 
The results of Models 4 and 5 demonstrated that when controlling for a transgressor’s 
perspective-taking and benevolence, perceptions of the transgressor’s guilt was not significantly 
associated with participants’ cooperation (ECS: B = 0.17, SE = 0.10, p = .095; SVO: B = 0.07, SE 
= 0.20, p = .725). 
The indirect effect of a transgressor’s benevolence, as well as a transgressor’s 
perspective-taking, on participants’ cooperation via perceptions of the transgressor’s guilt were 
tested using the same bootstrapping method as in Study 1. The results demonstrated non-
significant indirect effects of a transgressor’s benevolence (ECS: B = 0.16, SE = 0.10, -0.02 < 
95% CI < 0.38; SVO: B = 0.06, SE = 0.19, -0.31 < 95% CI < 0.44) and a transgressor’s 
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perspective-taking (ECS: B = 0.02, SE = 0.05, -0.07 < 95% CI < 0.13; SVO: B = 0.01, SE = 0.05, 
-0.08 < 95% CI < 0.12) on participants’ cooperation via perceptions of the transgressor’s guilt. 
SSGS measure of guilt. Model 3 demonstrated that a transgressor’s benevolence was 
significantly positively associated with perceptions of the transgressor’s guilt (B = 0.96, SE = 
0.13, p < .001), but the transgressor’s perspective-taking was not (B = 0.21, SE = 0.13, p = .114). 
The results of Models 4 and 5 demonstrated that when controlling for a transgressor’s 
perspective-taking and benevolence, perceptions of the transgressor’s guilt was significantly but 
inconsistently positively associated with participants’ cooperation (ECS: B = 0.49, SE = 0.14, p = 
.001; SVO: B = 0.26, SE = 0.29, p = .366). 
The indirect effects of a transgressor’s benevolence, as well as a transgressor’s 
perspective-taking, on participants’ cooperation via perceptions of the transgressor’s guilt were 
tested using the same bootstrapping method as in Study 1. The results demonstrated significant 
but inconsistent indirect effects of a transgressor’s benevolence on participants’ cooperation via 
perceptions of the transgressor’s guilt (ECS: B = 0.47, SE = 0.15, 0.19 < 95% CI < 0.79; SVO: B 
= 0.23, SE = 0.29, -0.33 < 95% CI < 0.80). However, the results demonstrated non-significant 
indirect effects of a transgressor’s perspective-taking on participants’ cooperation via perceptions 
of the transgressor’s guilt (ECS: B = 0.10, SE = 0.08, -0.05 < 95% CI < 0.28; SVO: B = 0.05, SE 
= 0.07, -0.06 < 95% CI < 0.23).  
Discussion 
 This study found partial support for an indirect effect of a transgressor’s benevolence, but 
not a transgressor’s perspective-taking, on a victim’s cooperation via perceptions of the 
transgressor’s guilt. Together with the results of Study 1, the results of Study 2 also suggest that 
there is a bidirectional relationship between a victim’s perceptions of a transgressor’s guilt and 
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benevolence, such that one can be inferred from the other. Although a significant indirect effect 
was found for the relationship between a transgressor’s benevolence and a victim’s cooperation 
via perceptions of the transgressor’s guilt, it was only found for the SSGS measure of guilt and 
the ECS measure of cooperation. It is possible that these significant results are due to common 
method bias. Common method bias refers to the spurious variance that can be attributed to the 
use of similar measurement methods rather than to the constructs that are assumed to be 
measured (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Richardson, Simmering, & Sturman, 2009). The SSGS 
measure of guilt and the ECS measure of cooperation have similar scale formats (i.e. Likert-type 
scale measures) whose responses come from the same rater (i.e. the participant), and these are 
potential sources of common method biases (Podsakoff et al., 2003). This would help to explain 
why the association between perceptions of a transgressor’s guilt and a victim’s cooperation is 
not significant with the SVO measure of cooperation. The SVO cooperation measure takes the 
form of a point allocation game, which has a different scale format and involves different 
cognitive processes in responding from a Likert-type scale that measures a participant’s 
perceptions. Hence, the significant findings in this study could simply be an artifact of the 
measurement methods used. 
General Discussion 
The findings of the studies supported the prediction that a transgressor’s guilt expression 
elicited cooperative behavior from victims after a social transgression indirectly through 
perceptions of the transgressor’s benevolence. However, although a transgressor’s guilt 
expression was positively associated with perceptions of both the transgressor’s benevolence and 
perspective-taking, the findings did not support the prediction that a transgressor’s guilt 
expression elicited cooperative behavior from victims indirectly through perceptions of the 
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transgressor’s perspective-taking. This indicates that although guilt expressions can elicit 
perceptions of benevolence and perspective-taking, it is the perception of a transgressor’s 
willingness to benefit others, rather than the perception of the transgressor’s ability to understand 
the point of view of the victim, that elicits cooperation in a social transgression setting.  
The results also showed support for a bidirectional relationship between perceptions of a 
transgressor’s guilt and benevolence, and partial support for the indirect effect of a transgressor’s 
benevolence on a victim’s cooperation via perceptions of the transgressor’s guilt. This suggests 
that not only do people perceive those who express guilt after a social transgression as higher in 
benevolence; they also perceive that those who act benevolently after a social transgression 
experience guilt. This has important implications for research on inferring others’ emotional 
states, especially for emotions that do not have any distinct facial expressions associated with 
them such as guilt (Keltner, 1996). Such emotions may instead be inferred by looking at others’ 
behavior rather than others’ facial expressions. Previous research has assumed that guilt can be 
inferred from the mere commitment of a transgression (Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973; 
Cunningham et al., 1980). However, my results demonstrate that the commitment of a 
transgression is not sufficient information for inferring others’ guilt. Instead, people seem to 
infer others’ guilt emotions from benevolence cues. In turn, these benevolence cues elicit 
cooperation from others via inferences of guilt emotions. A caveat is that this indirect effect was 
only significant for a specific measure of guilt and cooperation (i.e. SSGS and ECS). Thus, this 
indirect effect may be attributed to common method bias due to the similarity between these two 
measures.  
 This research contributes to existing research on the relationship between guilt 
expressions and other’s cooperative behavior by investigating the possible underlying 
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mechanisms through which this relationship occurs. For example, research demonstrated that 
communicated guilt mitigated the negative effects of transgressions on investment behaviors in a 
trust game (Shore & Parkinson, 2017). Building off of the EASI model, my investigation 
contributes to such findings by explaining why communicated guilt has this effect (i.e. through 
social perceptions). This investigation serves as one of the pioneering studies that empirically 
examined the social perceptions that arise from guilt expressions and that can elicit cooperation, 
that is, the perception of the transgressor’s benevolence rather than the perception of the 
transgressor’s perspective-taking. Thus, the perception that a past transgressor now intends to do 
good may explain why communicated guilt could decrease the negative effects of transgressions 
on investment behaviors in a trust game. 
This investigation also adds to previous research on the social perceptions associated with 
guilt expressions. For example, past research found that people who expressed guilt were rated as 
having higher levels of morality and liking than those who did not express guilt after a social 
transgression (Stearns & Parrott, 2012). Stearns and Parrott’s (2012) studies made use of 
autobiographical vignettes for the investigation on social perceptions whereas Study 1 made use 
of actual behavioral transgressions by a transgressor. Researchers have argued that the use of 
experimental vignettes does not necessarily demonstrate outcomes that can generalize to natural 
settings (Hughes & Huby, 2002). Hence, by directly making participants the victim of a 
transgression in Study 1, I was able to increase the realism of the experimental situation and 
demonstrate the real life social perceptions that may arise from guilt expressions.  
This investigation also illuminates the relationship between perspective-taking and 
cooperation. My results found that perceptions of a transgressor’s perspective-taking were less 
influential in eliciting cooperation; however, previous research has shown that a transgressor’s 
 25 
 
 
guilt expressions, such as apologies and expressions of remorse, result in a victim’s increased 
empathy (including perspective-taking) towards the transgressor (J. R. Davis & Gold, 2011; 
Gold & Davis, 2005). An individual’s empathy towards others can also motivate the individual 
to cooperate with others (Batson, 1987; Xu, Kou, & Zhong, 2012). Thus, future research could 
examine whether a transgressor’s guilt expressions could elicit a victim’s cooperative behavior 
via the victim’s increased empathy toward the transgressor, rather than via perceptions of the 
transgressor’s empathy. 
A perception of perspective-taking may also be more relevant for other relationship-
repairing outcomes other than cooperation. For example, an inadequate perception of a spouse’s 
perspective-taking has been found to be predictive of a propensity to divorce (Long, 1994), 
leading to relationship dissolution. Relationship dissolution can also be investigated in the 
context of the Dictator Game in Study 1. If participants were given the option to switch their 
Dictator Game partner, a perception of perspective-taking may be negatively associated with a 
willingness to switch partners (and subsequent relationship dissolution). A measure of 
willingness to switch partners would allow for a greater range of relationship-repair behavior 
because participants can not only choose to allocate points to the transgressor from a range of 0-
100, they can also choose to refuse to play with the transgressor altogether. This greater range in 
measurement may be better able to pick up the nuanced effects that a perception of perspective-
taking may have on relationship repair behaviors. A perception of a partner’s perspective-taking 
has also been found to be positively related to recovery after relational stress in marriages 
(Koenig et al., 2013). Thus, although a perception of perspective-taking was not found to be 
related to cooperation in my studies, it is possible that a perception of perspective-taking leads to 
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other relationship repair behaviors and is therefore still important in social transgression 
situations. 
Previous research has demonstrated that expressions of guilt cause victims to concede 
less in negotiations (Van Kleef et al., 2006), which implies a negative association between guilt 
expressions and cooperation. Van Kleef et al. (2006) argue that the victim may concede less 
because they expect that the transgressor will make concessions in order to compensate for his or 
her transgression. This suggests that victims perceive that expressers of guilt will be benevolent 
and make concessions, which is in line with my findings regarding the social perception of 
benevolence that would arise from guilt expressions. However, the participants in Van Kleef et 
al.’s (2006) studies may have cooperated less as a result of this perception of benevolence, rather 
than more as was found in my studies, because participants in a negotiation task focus on a 
maximization of their own benefits (Straus, 1999) and therefore perceptions of a transgressor’s 
benevolence would elicit their competitive responses. In contrast, the sequential Dictator Game 
in my studies offered an opportunity for participants to benefit each other and therefore 
perceptions of a transgressor’s benevolence might motivate participants to cooperate with the 
transgressor. Hence, my investigation further contributes to existing research on social 
perceptions associated with guilt expressions, as well as subsequent cooperative behavior, by 
using a different task type that may involve different cooperation dynamics. Future research 
could further investigate the moderating effects of task types on a victim’s willingness to 
cooperate with a transgressor who is expressing guilt and who is perceived to be benevolent. 
One possible limitation of my studies could be that the guilt expression was perceived as 
strategically regulated as this expression involved messages intended to be read by the 
participant, which may reduce the positive impact of guilt expressions on cooperation. Shore and 
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Parkinson (2017) found that the positive effects of communicated guilt on trust toward the 
communicator became diminished when the communicated guilt was perceived as strategically 
regulated. Thus, when guilt expressions are perceived to be strategically regulated, they may be 
less effective in eliciting cooperation, which may explain why the guilt expressions in my studies 
had no significant total effect on a perceiver’s cooperation. Future research could investigate the 
effects of a perception of strategic regulation on the association between guilt expressions and 
cooperation. In addition, future research could improve upon my studies by increasing the 
genuineness of the guilt expressions. For instance, participants could be shown the transgressor’s 
guilt emotion ratings and be informed that the transgressor was unaware that the participant 
would read his or her ratings (Shore & Parkinson, 2017). This would reduce the perception of a 
guilt expresser’s strategic regulation and increase the genuineness of the guilt expression, which 
may be more effective in eliciting cooperation from perceivers. 
Another possible limitation could be the wording of the perspective-taking and 
benevolence scales. The benevolence scale included the word “now” which provided a reference 
point for participants to rate the transgressor’s level of benevolence after the transgression rather 
than the level of benevolence before the transgression. However, the perspective-taking scale did 
not include the word “now” which may have confused participants and led some of them to rate 
the transgressor’s level of perspective-taking before the transgression and others to rate the level 
of perspective-taking after the transgression. This may explain why we did not find any 
significant findings regarding a perception of perspective-taking as these ratings may have 
canceled each other out. Hence, future research should take care to specify the exact reference 
point for which participants are supposed to make their ratings. 
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Another limitation of this research could be the use of a scenario study in Study 2. This 
study differed from Study 1 as it made use of scenarios and asked participants to imagine 
themselves as victims of a social transgression, rather than actually making them victims of a 
social transgression. Some researchers have argued that people’s inferences and actions in real 
life are not comparable to their inferences and actions when making sense of a story or a scenario 
(Parkinson & Manstead, 1993). This would suggest that the outcomes found in scenario studies 
may not necessarily generalize to real-life natural settings. However, other researchers have 
argued that scenario studies can enhance external validity if the scenarios are realistic enough 
(Aguinis & Bradley, 2014). Thus, to circumvent the possible limitations of scenario studies, 
future research could enhance the experimental realism of scenario studies by creating more 
realistic scenarios. For example, the manipulations of perspective-taking and benevolence in 
Study 2 could have been made more realistic by giving specific examples of how the 
transgressor demonstrated these constructs, such as the transgressor offering to help the victim 
with their own project as a demonstration of benevolence. Future research should also make use 
of triangulation and conduct additional research in more naturalistic settings as in Study 1. 
Conclusion 
 I conducted two experiments to investigate the perceptions associated with a 
transgressor’s guilt expression and how they can subsequently influence a victim’s cooperative 
behavior toward a transgressor. I found an indirect effect of a transgressor’s guilt expression on a 
victim’s cooperation via the victim’s perception of the transgressor’s benevolence, rather than 
the perception of the transgressor’s perspective-taking. The results suggest that a display of 
concern for another’s best interests is more important for cooperation and relationship repair 
after a transgression than a display of empathy for another’s perspective. Thus, a demonstration 
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of a willingness to benefit others is an effective way to elicit cooperation from the victim of a 
social transgression and to repair the relationship between the victim and the transgressor. This 
investigation has important implications for social transgression research and highlights the 
essential role that guilt expressions play in cooperative processes and human relationships. 
 30 
 
 
References 
Aguinis, H., & Bradley, K. J. (2014). Best practice recommendations for designing and 
implementing experimental vignette methodology studies. Organizational Research 
Methods, 17(4), 351-371.  
Ahn, H.-K., Kim, H. J., & Aggarwal, P. (2014). Helping fellow beings: Anthropomorphized 
social causes and the role of anticipatory guilt. Psychological science, 25(1), 224-229. 
doi: 10.1177/0956797613496823 
Aune, R. K., Metts, S., & Ebesu-Hubbard, A. S. (1998). Managing the outcomes of discovered 
deception. Journal of Social Psychology, 138(6), 677-689. doi: 
10.1080/00224549809603254 
Batson, C. D. (1987). Prosocial motivation: Is it ever truly altruistic? In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. New York: Academic Press. 
Batson, C. D. (1991). The altruism question: Toward a social-psychological answer. Hillsdale, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Batson, C. D., Turk, C. L., Shaw, L. L., & Klein, T. R. (1995). Information function of empathic 
emotion: Learning that we value the other's welfare. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 68(2), 300-313.  
Baumeister, R. F., Stillwell, A. M., & Heatherton, T. F. (1994). Guilt: An interpersonal 
approach. Psychological Bulletin, 115(2), 243-267. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.115.2.243 
Berndsen, M., Wenzel, M., Thomas, E. F., & Noske, B. (2017). I feel you feel what I feel: 
Perceived perspective‐taking promotes victims ‘conciliatory attitudes because of 
 31 
 
 
inferred emotions in the offender. European Journal of Social Psychology, 48(2), O103-
O120. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2321 
Berscheid, E., & Walster, E. (1967). When does a harm-doer compensate a victim? Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 6, 435-441. doi: 10.1037/h0024828 
Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall. 
Brosig, J. (2002). Identifying cooperative behavior: Some experimental results in a prisoner’s 
dilemma game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 47(3), 275-290. doi: 
10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00211-6 
Buss, A. H. (1980). Self-consciousness and social anxiety. San Francisco: Freeman. 
Byrne, A., Barling, J., & Dupré, K. E. (2014). Leader apologies and employee and leader well-
being. Journal of Business Ethics, 121(1), 91-106.  
Chua, R. Y. J., Morris, M. W., & Mor, S. (2012). Collaborating across cultures: Cultural 
metacognition and affect-based trust in creative collaboration. Organizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Processes, 118(2), 116-131. doi: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.03.009 
Cialdini, R. B., Darby, B. L., & Vincent, J. E. (1973). Transgression and altruism: A case for 
hedonism. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 9(6), 502-516.  
Coke, J. S., Batson, C. D., & McDavis, K. (1978). Empathic mediation of helping: A two-stage 
model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36(7), 752-766.  
Cunningham, M. R., Steinberg, J., & Grev, R. (1980). Wanting to and having to help: Separate 
motivations for positive mood and guilt-induced helping. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 38(2), 181-192. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.38.2.181 
 32 
 
 
Darwin, C. (1872). The expression of the emotions in man and animals. London, England: 
Murray. 
Davis, J. R., & Gold, G. J. (2011). An examination of emotional empathy, attributions of 
stability, and the link between perceived remorse and forgiveness. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 50(3), 392-397. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2010.10.031 
Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a 
multidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44(1), 113-
126. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.44.1.113 
Davis, M. H., Capobianco, S., & Kraus, L. A. (2004). Measuring conflict-related behaviors: 
Reliability and validity evidence regarding the conflict dynamics profile. Educational 
and Psychological Measurement, 64(4), 707-731.  
De Cremer, D., Snyder, M., & Dewitte, S. (2001). ‘The less I trust, the less I contribute (or 
not)?’The effects of trust, accountability and self‐monitoring in social dilemmas. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 31(1), 93-107.  
De Hooge, I. E., Zeelenberg, M., & Breugelmans, S. M. (2007). Moral sentiments and 
cooperation: Differential influences of shame and guilt. Cognition and Emotion, 21(5), 
1025-1042. doi: 10.1080/02699930600980874 
DeRue, D. S., Nahrgang, J. D., & Ashford, S. J. (2015). Interpersonal perceptions and the 
emergence of leadership structures in groups: A network perspective. Organization 
Science, 26(4), 1192-1209.  
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1971). Constants across cultures in the face and emotion. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 17(2), 124-129.  
 33 
 
 
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415, 137-140. doi: 
10.1038/415137a 
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., & Glick, P. (2007). Universal dimensions of social cognition: Warmth 
and competence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(2), 77-83.  
Fu, F., Wu, T., & Wang, L. (2009). Partner switching stabilizes cooperation in coevolutionary 
prisoner’s dilemma. Physical Review E, 79(3), 036101. doi: 
10.1103/PhysRevE.79.036101 
Gächter, S., Herrmann, B., & Thöni, C. (2004). Trust, voluntary cooperation, and socio-
economic background: Survey and experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization, 55(4), 505-531. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.11.006 
Galinsky, A. D., Ku, G., & Wang, C. S. (2005). Perspective-taking and self-other overlap: 
Fostering social bonds and facilitating social coordination. Group Processes & 
Intergroup Relations, 8(2), 109-124.  
Galperin, A., Fessler, D. M., Johnson, K. L., & Haselton, M. G. (2013). Seeing storms behind the 
clouds: Biases in the attribution of anger. Evolution and Human Behavior, 34(5), 358-
365.  
Gold, G. J., & Davis, J. R. (2005). Psychological determinants of forgiveness: An evolutionary 
perspective. Humboldt Journal of Social Relations, 29(2), 111-134.  
Goldstein, N. J., Vezich, I. S., & Shapiro, J. R. (2014). Perceived perspective taking: When 
others walk in our shoes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 106(6), 941-960. 
doi: 10.1037/a0036395 
Gonzales, M. H., Kovera, M. B., Sullivan, J. L., & Chanley, V. (1995). Private reactions to 
public transgressions: Predictors of evaluative responses to allegations of political 
 34 
 
 
misconduct. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21(2), 136-148. doi: 
10.1177/0146167295212004 
Guerrero, L. K., La Valley, A. G., & Farinelli, L. (2008). The experience and expression of 
anger, guilt, and sadness in marriage: An equity theory explanation. Journal of Social and 
Personal Relationships, 25(5), 699-724.  
Haesevoets, T., Joosten, A., Folmer, C. R., Lerner, L., De Cremer, D., & Van Hiel, A. (2016). 
The impact of decision timing on the effectiveness of leaders’ apologies to repair 
followers’ trust in the aftermath of leader failure. Journal of Business and Psychology, 
31(4), 533-551.  
Hareli, S., & Eisikovits, Z. (2006). The role of communicating social emotions accompanying 
apologies in forgiveness. Motivation and Emotion, 30(3), 189-197. doi: 10.1007/s11031-
006-9025-x 
Hoffman, M. L. (1982). Development of prosocial motivation: Empathy and guilt. In N. 
Eisenberg (Ed.), The development of prosocial behavior (pp. 281-313). New York: 
Academic Press. 
Howell, A. J., Turowski, J. B., & Buro, K. (2012). Guilt, empathy, and apology. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 53(7), 917-922.  
Hughes, R., & Huby, M. (2002). The application of vignettes in social and nursing research. 
Journal of advanced nursing, 37(4), 382-386. doi: 10.1046/j.1365-2648.2002.02100.x  
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1986). Fairness and the assumptions of 
economics. Journal of Business, 59, S285-S300.  
 35 
 
 
Kamau, C., Giner-Sorolla, R., & Zebel, S. (2013). Reconciliation responses, blame, and 
expressions of guilt or shame. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 43(S2), E287-E292. 
doi: 10.1111/jasp.12048  
Karremans, J. C., & Van Lange, P. A. (2004). Back to caring after being hurt: The role of 
forgiveness. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34(2), 207-227. doi: 
10.1002/ejsp.192  
Keltner, D. (1996). Evidence for the distinctness of embarrassment, shame, and guilt: A study of 
recalled antecedents and facial expressions of emotion. Cognition & Emotion, 10(2), 155-
172.  
Ketelaar, T., & Au, W. (2003). The effects of guilt on the behavior of uncooperative individuals 
in repeated social bargaining games: An affect-as-information interpretation of the role of 
emotion in social interaction. Cognition and Emotion, 17, 429-453. doi: 
10.1080/02699930143000662 
Koenig, J. K., Willer, E. K., & Trees, A. R. (2013). Communicated perspective-taking during 
stories of marital stress: Spouses' perceptions of one another's perspective-taking 
behaviors. Southern Communication Journal, 78(4), 326-351.  
Leith, K. P., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Empathy, shame, guilt, and narratives of interpersonal 
conflicts: Guilt‐prone people are better at perspective taking. Journal of Personality, 
66(1), 1-37. doi: 10.1111/1467-6494.00001  
Levin, D. Z., & Cross, R. (2004). The strength of weak ties you can trust: The mediating role of 
trust in effective knowledge transfer. Management Science, 50(11), 1477-1490. doi: 
10.1287/mnsc.1030.0136 
 36 
 
 
Levine, E. E., Bitterly, T. B., Cohen, T. R., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2018). Who is trustworthy? 
Predicting trustworthy intentions and behavior. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology. doi: 10.1037/pspi0000136 
Lewis, H. B. (1971). Shame and guilt in neurosis. New York: International Press. 
Long, E. C. (1994). Maintaining a stable marriage: Perspective taking as a predictor of a 
propensity to divorce. Journal of Divorce & Remarriage, 21(1-2), 121-138.  
Luchies, L. B., Wieselquist, J., Rusbult, C. E., Kumashiro, M., Eastwick, P. W., Coolsen, M. K., 
& Finkel, E. J. (2013). Trust and biased memory of transgressions in romantic 
relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104(4), 673-694. doi: 
10.1037/a0031054 
Marschall, D., Sanftner, J., & Tangney, J. P. (1994). The state shame and guilt scale. George 
Mason University. Fairfax, VA.  
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational 
trust. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 709-734. doi: 
10.5465/amr.1995.9508080335 
McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect-and cognition-based trust as foundations for interpersonal 
cooperation in organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1), 24-59. doi: 
10.5465/256727 
Ng, K. Y., & Chua, R. Y. (2006). Do I contribute more when I trust more? Differential effects of 
cognition‐and affect‐based trust. Management and Organization Review, 2(1), 43-66.  
O'Neill, O. A. (2009). Workplace expression of emotions and escalation of commitment. Journal 
of Applied Social Psychology, 39(10), 2396-2424.  
 37 
 
 
Oatley, K. (1999). Why fiction may be twice as true as fact: Fiction as cognitive and emotional 
simulation. Review of General Psychology, 3(2), 101-117.  
Okimoto, T. G., & Wenzel, M. (2014). Bridging diverging perspectives and repairing damaged 
relationships in the aftermath of workplace transgressions. Business Ethics Quarterly, 
24(3), 443-473.  
Parkinson, B., & Manstead, A. S. (1993). Making sense of emotion in stories and social life. 
Cognition & Emotion, 7(3-4), 295-323.  
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common method 
biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended 
remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879-903. doi: 10.1037/0021-
9010.88.5.879 
Richardson, H. A., Simmering, M. J., & Sturman, M. C. (2009). A tale of three perspectives: 
Examining post hoc statistical techniques for detection and correction of common method 
variance. Organizational Research Methods, 12(4), 762-800.  
Ritzenhöfer, L., Brosi, P., Spörrle, M., & Welpe, I. M. (2017). Leader pride and gratitude 
differentially impact follower trust. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 32(6), 445-459.  
Rom, S. C., Weiss, A., & Conway, P. (2017). Judging those who judge: Perceivers infer the roles 
of affect and cognition underpinning others' moral dilemma responses. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 69, 44-58. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2016.09.007 
Scher, S. J., & Darley, J. M. (1997). How effective are the things people say to apologize? 
Effects of the realization of the apology speech act. Journal of psycholinguistic research, 
26(1), 127-140.  
 38 
 
 
Schmidt, K. L., & Cohn, J. F. (2001). Human facial expressions as adaptations: Evolutionary 
questions in facial expression research. American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 
116(S33), 3-24.  
Shariff, A. F., & Tracy, J. L. (2011). What are emotion expressions for? Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 20(6), 395-399.  
Shen, L. (2010). On a scale of state empathy during message processing. Western Journal of 
Communication, 74(5), 504-524. doi: 10.1080/10570314.2010.512278 
Shore, D. M., & Parkinson, B. (2017). Interpersonal effects of strategic and spontaneous guilt 
communication in trust games. Cognition and Emotion, 1-9. doi: 
10.1080/02699931.2017.1395728 
Smetana, J. G. (1984). Toddlers' social interactions regarding moral and conventional 
transgressions. Child Development, 55(5), 1767-1776. doi: 10.2307/1129924 
Smith, A. K., Bolton, R. N., & Wagner, J. (1999). A model of customer satisfaction with service 
encounters involving failure and recovery. Journal of Marketing Research, 36(3), 356-
372.  
Stearns, D. C., & Parrott, W. G. (2012). When feeling bad makes you look good: Guilt, shame, 
and person perception. Cognition & Emotion, 26(3), 407-430. doi: 
10.1080/02699931.2012.675879 
Steiner, C. (2000). Apology: The transactional analysis of a fundamental exchange. 
Transactional Analysis Journal, 30(2), 145-149.  
Straus, S. G. (1999). Testing a typology of tasks - An empirical validation of McGrath's (1984) 
group task circumplex. Small Group Research, 30(2), 166-187. doi: 
10.1177/104649649903000202 
 39 
 
 
Swann, W. B. (1987). Identity negotiation: Where two roads meet. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 53(6), 1038-1051.  
Tangney, J. P., Miller, R. S., Flicker, L., & Barlow, D. H. (1996). Are shame, guilt, and 
embarrassment distinct emotions? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(6), 
1256-1269. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.70.6.1256 
Trivers, R. (1985). Social evolution. Redwood City, CA: Benjamin-Cummings. 
Usoro, A., Sharratt, M. W., Tsui, E., & Shekhar, S. (2007). Trust as an antecedent to knowledge 
sharing in virtual communities of practice. Knowledge Management Research & 
Practice, 5(3), 199-212. doi: 10.1057/palgrave.kmrp.8500143 
Vaish, A., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Sympathy through affective perspective 
taking and its relation to prosocial behavior in toddlers. Developmental psychology, 
45(2), 534.  
Van Kleef, G. A. (2009). How emotions regulate social life: The emotions as social information 
(EASI) model. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 18(3), 184-188. doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01633.x 
Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K., & Manstead, A. S. (2006). Supplication and appeasement in 
conflict and negotiation: The interpersonal effects of disappointment, worry, guilt, and 
regret. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91(1), 124-142. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.91.1.124 
Van Lange, P. A. (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in outcomes: An integrative 
model of social value orientation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(2), 
337-349.  
 40 
 
 
Walster, E., Berscheid, E., & Walster, G. W. (1973). New directions in equity research. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 25(2), 151-176.  
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures 
of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 54(6), 1063-1070.  
Williams, M. (2007). Building genuine trust through interpersonal emotion management: A 
threat regulation model of trust and collaboration across boundaries. Academy of 
Management Review, 32(2), 595-621.  
Williams, M. (2012). Building and rebuilding trust: Why perspective taking matters. In R. 
Kramer & T. L. Pittinsky (Eds.), Restoring trust: Enduring challenges and emerging 
answers. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Wojciszke, B. (2005). Affective concomitants of information on morality and competence. 
European Psychologist, 10(1), 60-70.  
Xie, Y., & Peng, S. (2009). How to repair customer trust after negative publicity: The roles of 
competence, integrity, benevolence, and forgiveness. Psychology & Marketing, 26(7), 
572-589. doi: 10.1002/mar.20289  
Xu, H., Kou, Y., & Zhong, N. (2012). The effect of empathy on cooperation, forgiveness, and 
“Returning Good for Evil” in the prisoner's dilemma. Public Personnel Management, 
41(5), 105-115. doi: 10.1177/009102601204100510 
Yang, M.-L., Yang, C.-C., & Chiou, W.-B. (2010). When guilt leads to other orientation and 
shame leads to egocentric self-focus: Effects of differential priming of negative affects on 
perspective taking. Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal, 38(5), 
605-614. doi: 10.2224/sbp.2010.38.5.605 
 41 
 
 
Tables 
Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of All Focal Variables in Study 1 
Variables 
 
Mean SD 1.  2.  3. 
1. Emotion expression 0.49 0.50    
2. Perceived Perspective-Taking 2.64 1.17  0.25***   
3. Perceived Benevolence 3.00 1.47  0.23***  0.26***  
4. Cooperation  32.37 28.83 -0.08 -0.03 0.15* 
Note: * p < 0.05; *** p < 0.001. Emotion expression: 1 = guilt, 0 = neutral. 
 
Table 2 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analyses in Study 1 
Variables Model 1  
DV: 
Cooperation 
Model 2 
DV: Perceived 
Perspective-Taking 
Model 3 
DV: Perceived 
Benevolence 
Model 4 
DV: 
Cooperation 
Emotion Expression -4.47 
(3.87) 
     0.58*** 
(0.15) 
     0.69*** 
(0.19) 
-6.29 
(4.01) 
Perceived Perspective-
Taking 
       
 
       
 
       
 
-1.27 
(1.73) 
Perceived Benevolence        3.74** 
(1.37) 
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.03 
F-value 1.34     14.73***     12.67***   2.95* 
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Emotion expression: 1 = guilt, 0 = neutral. All 
regression coefficients are unstandardized. The numbers in the parentheses represent standard 
errors. 
 
Table 3 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of All Focal Variables in Study 2 
Variables 
 
Mean SD 1.  2.  3. 4. 5. 
1. Transgressor’s Perspective-
Taking 
0.51 0.50      
2. Transgressor’s Benevolence 0.50 0.50 -0.02     
3. Perceived Guilt (PANAS) 2.81 1.44  0.04 0.33***     
4. Perceived Guilt (SSGS) 2.55 1.07 0.09 0.45*** 0.60***   
5. Cooperation (ECS) 4.79 1.98  0.01 0.11 0.15* 0.26***  
6. Cooperation (SVO) 3.39 3.89 -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.30*** 
Note: * p < 0.05; *** p < 0.001. Transgressor’s Perspective-Taking: 1 = High perspective-
taking, 0 = Low perspective-taking. Transgressor’s Benevolence: 1 = High benevolence, 0 = 
Low benevolence.  
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Table 4 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analyses in Study 2 with PANAS measure 
Variables Model 1  
DV: 
Cooperation 
(ECS) 
Model 2  
DV: 
Cooperation 
(SVO) 
Model 3 
DV: Perceived 
Guilt (PANAS) 
Model 4 
DV: 
Cooperation 
(ECS) 
Model 5 
DV: 
Cooperation 
(SVO) 
Transgressor’s Perspective-
Taking 
0.03 
(0.28) 
         -0.39 
(0.55) 
0.12 
(0.19) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
         -0.40 
(0.55) 
Transgressor’s Benevolence 0.45       
(0.28) 
0.13 
(0.55) 
     0.94*** 
(0.19) 
0.29 
(0.29) 
0.06 
(0.58) 
Perceived Guilt (PANAS)    0.17 
(0.10) 
          0.07 
(0.20) 
Adjusted R2 0.00 -0.01 0.10 0.01 -0.01 
F-value 1.32 0.28    12.22*** 1.82 0.23 
Note: *** p < 0.001. All regression coefficients are unstandardized. The numbers in the parentheses represent standard errors. 
Transgressor’s Perspective-Taking: 1 = High perspective-taking, 0 = Low perspective-taking. Transgressor’s Benevolence: 1 = High 
benevolence, 0 = Low benevolence.  
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Table 5 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analyses in Study 2 with SSGS measure 
Variables Model 1  
DV: Cooperation 
(ECS) 
Model 2  
DV: Cooperation 
(SVO) 
Model 3 
DV: Perceived 
Guilt  
Model 4 
DV: Cooperation 
(ECS) 
Model 5 
DV: Cooperation 
(SVO) 
Transgressor’s 
Perspective-Taking 
0.03 
(0.28) 
          -0.39 
(0.55) 
0.21 
(0.13) 
-0.08 
(0.27) 
          -0.44 
(0.55) 
Transgressor’s 
Benevolence 
0.45       
(0.28) 
0.13 
(0.55) 
     0.96*** 
(0.13) 
-0.02 
(0.30) 
          -0.12 
(0.61) 
Perceived Guilt 
(SSGS) 
       0.49** 
(0.14) 
           0.26 
(0.29) 
Adjusted R2 0.00 -0.01 0.20 0.05 -0.01 
F-value 1.32 0.28     27.14***   4.88** 0.46 
Note: ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. All regression coefficients are unstandardized. The numbers in the parentheses represent standard 
errors. Transgressor’s Perspective-Taking: 1 = High perspective-taking, 0 = Low perspective-taking. Transgressor’s Benevolence: 1 = 
High benevolence, 0 = Low benevolence.  
 
